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1. Introduction  
    The Japanese society is known around the world for accomplishing astounding 
economic growth in the post-war era and at the same time realizing a commendable 
degree of equality in the distribution of income. Sustaining low rates of unemployment in 
the presence of business cycles poses a real wonder for macroeconomists. Overall 
achievement in human development measures reported in the existing issues of the 
Human Development Report is also very high. Yet there seem to be many problems that 
remain to be resolved. Clearly there is a need for a well-balanced evaluation of the 
achievements of the four decades.  
    The organization of this report is as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 review concisely the 
basic accomplishments in the arena of economic growth, income distribution, poverty 
abatement, and conditions of human development, respectively, during the period 1955-
1993. Since most researchers agree that the postwar Japanese economic development 
started from 1955, in which year the economy restored the pre-war peak level of 
production, we shall take 1955 to be the beginning year of this study.  
    Section 5 then focuses on the rapid growth period of 1955-73, in which income 
equalization, poverty reduction and improvement in human development conditions 
occurred simultaneously with growth. It also explains why rapid growth and income 
equalization went hand in hand and in what way the latter might have caused the former.  
    Section 6 characterizes the development in the size and composition of the government 
expenditure during the rapid growth era and the post-rapid growth era while also explains 
the mechanism by which the government might have promoted growth and equalization 
together. It also shows using a regression analysis that the government expenditure on 
hygiene has had a positive effect on reducing the infant and child mortality rates which 
was independent of the effect of the growth of per capita household income. That is, there 
were indeed some areas in which the government made a direct contribution in improving 
the human development conditions.  
    Section 7 concludes by leaving qualifications to the economic policies with regard to 
growth, income distribution and human development and by indicating the problems that still lie ahead to be resolved in this country from the perspective of human development.  
   
2. The basic indicators of economic growth  
    The characteristics of the Japanese economic growth path during 1955&shyp;1993 can 
be summarized by Figure 1, in which the growth rate of real per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) and that of real per capita household disposable income are shown. There 
is a clear demarcation in the growth trend before and after the year 1973. The former 
interval is known as the rapid growth era with real GDP per capita rising at 8 per cent 
annually on average, while the latter can be designated as the slow growth era with real 
GDP per capita rising at 3 per cent annually.  
    Figure 2 shows the accompanying accumulation of wealth in both as a nation and as 
within the household sector, in particular. For the nation as a whole the ratio of (end-of-
year) net national worth (which is the sum of real assets and the net financial claims on 
foreign countries) over GDP is taken, while for the household the ratio of net worth over 
disposable income is shown. The two series have naturally proceeded in a parallel 
manner. The curves are not monotone, however, as there are three humps along the rising 
trend (the first one being a relatively mild one). The first hump occurs in the beginning of 
the 1960s, the second one in 1973&shyp;4, and the third one at the end of the 1980s. As 
the accompanying curves representing the non-land component of wealth show they 
originate largely from the periodical upward spurts in land values. The ratio of net 
financial wealth of the household over disposable income rose from 0.57 in 1955 to 2.18 
in 1993.  
    Japan underwent a major structural transformation from a semi-industrialized agrarian 
country in the late 1950s towards a leading member of the world's top industralized 
nations. Nothing is more telling than the fact that this country returned to the 
international trade scene after World War II in the late 1950s by exporting the so-called 
"one-dollar blouse" to the low-end American market, whereas now it has become one of 
the two greatest exporting countries of advanced machine tools in the world. Its financial 
market has been almost completely integrated with the global capital market since the 
mid-1980s, and, moreover, it has started to play a large financial intermediary role in the 
world.  
    One significant characteristic of the economy that has well been maintained throughout 
the period, however, is that the majority of the population work in small firms or under 
small proprietorship.  
    The nature of the employment structure by industry and by firm size and its change 
over time are summarized in Figure 3. It shows the proportion of each category of 
workers in the total working population. The agricultural working population declined 
steadily from 40 per cent in 1956 to a mere 5 per cent in 1992. The workers in the 
manufacturing sector rose from 18 per cent in 1956 to 28 per cent in 1974, and then 
turned to a gradual decline, reaching 24 per cent in 1992.      The prevalence of small firms can be confirmed by the fact that individuals who 
belong to firms or proprietorships with less than 100 workers have continued to constitute 
a sizeable majority of the working population; confined to the non-agricultural sector its 
proportion stayed almost constant around 55&shyp;60 per cent. On the other hand, 
workers who belong to firms with more than 1,000 employees remarkably have kept a 
constant share of a little less than a quarter, implying the existence of constant 
replenishing and net births of small firms.  
   
3. The Basic indicators of human development  
    Significant improvement in various spheres of human development occurred 
simultaneously. The movement of components related with the human development 
index is exhibited by a series of figures which follows.  
Public Hygiene  
    First, the decrease of the rates of infant mortality, under-five mortality and maternal 
mortality is shown in Figure 4. The infant mortality rate hovered around 40 per thousand 
births during the latter 1950s and ever since declined to reach 4.3 per thousand births in 
1993, which is on of the lowest rates in the world. The decline during 1958&shyp;1965 
was particularly rapid and was almost linear in shape. Since then the rate of decline has 
gradually tapered off. Under-five mortality and maternal mortality rates show quite 
similar patterns of development over time, declining towards 120 per one hundred 
thousand individuals for the former and 7.4 per one hundred thousand births for the latter 
in the early 1990s, which are 1/9 and 1/21, respectively, to those in the late 1950s.  
    Second, improvement of the life expectancy at birth is shown in Figure 5 for male and 
female separately. Since 1958 until the early 1980s it rose almost linearly for both sexes, 
from whence the rate of increase started to taper off. The levels achieved in 1993, 76.2 
for male, 82.5 for female (79.4 as a simple weighted average between male and female), 
are among the highest in the world.  
    Third, related to the condition of public health and hygiene is the development of the 
tap water and public sewage system, which are charted in Figure 6. Tap water was 
available only among one-third of the entire population in 1955. It expanded very quickly 
during the latter 1950s and the 1960s, already reaching 80 per cent by 1970. On the other 
hand, expansion of the sewage system was relatively delayed. Its availability was almost 
nil to start with (2.6 per cent in 1958), and while it expanded steadily, still only 49 per 
cent of the entire population is covered by the system in 1993.  
Education  
    Several indicators are presented concerning school education. In order to understand 
where we started from the pre-World War II development in the sphere of school 
education is reviewed first.      Spreading of elementary education and the establishment of university education were 
vehemently pursued by the modern Meiji government from its very beginning (with the 
Ministry of Education established in 1871 and the promulgation of school law in 1872) 
and since 1886 primary education has been compulsory. Apart from its practical 
worthiness to individuals, school education was then considered a major instrument in 
strengthening the nation politically, economically and militarily.  
    Table 1 suggests that already by 1895 most young men had completed primary school 
(which was a four-year curriculum); women gradually catching up. By 1930, 90 per cent 
of men and 77 per cent of women between the ages of 15 and 64 had attained primary 
school education. The same table also shows that the spread of secondary and university 
education was very limited before World War II. The school enrolment ratio continued to 
rise during the war and by 1955 practically every one (99.3 per cent of men and 98.9 per 
cent of women between the ages of 15 and 64) had completed primary education.  
    The movement of high (secondary) school enrolment ratio and that of four-year college 
during the period 1955&shyp;93 are shown in Figure 7. The former, which was 53 per 
cent in 1955, increased steeply from the late 1950s until the early 1970s, reaching 90 per 
cent in 1973. Since then it has flattened out reaching 96 per cent in 1993. The latter, on 
the other hand, exhibits a somewhat more complicated movement. It hovers around 8 per 
cent until 1960 and then makes a sharp increase until the mid-1970s, reaching the peak of 
27 per cent in 1976. There exists, however, a hump in the mid-1960s; this may be 
regarded as the effect of the recession of 1965. Since the mid-1970s, the ratio declined a 
little until it rose again, reaching 28 per cent in 1993. Figure 7 also shows the college 
enrolment ratio specifically in the field of science, agriculture and technology.  
    Such an expansion of school enrolment raised the level of educational attainment of 
the population significantly as shown by Table 2. Whereas in 1960 less than a third of the 
working age population (aged 15&shyp;64) had completed secondary or higher 
education, in 1990 the corresponding figure increased to two thirds. Moreover, during the 
same period individuals without any form of schooling have decreased from 0.7 per cent 
to 0.1 per cent among the working-age population.  
    The conditions of school classroom also improved during the period. The movement in 
the average classroom size as well the number of teachers per pupil in primary schools 
are exhibited here as Figure 8. The "elementary school" refers to the first six years of 
primary education, while the "middle school" refers to the later three years. The two sets 
of humps in the figure, one in the late 1950s and the other in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s (for elementary schools), reflect the impact of the first and second baby booms. 
There is a slight increase in the ratio of teachers per classroom, suggesting an expansion 
of the room for special and extra-curricular activities in schools.  
   
4. Basic indicators of income distribution and poverty income distribution      The nature of the change in the distribution of household income during the period 
from the 1950s throughout the early 1990s can be summarized by two figures.  
    Figure 9(a),(b) represents the movement of the shares of annual gross income received 
by (two or more persons) households in the top and the bottom income quintile groups. 
Figure 9(a) refers to the non-agricultural employee households, whereas Figure 9(b) 
refers to all non-agricultural households, including, in addition to employees, the self-
employed, corporate managers, and non-working households. There occurs a 
discontinuity in the curves representing the income shares in Figure 9(a) where the data 
until 1962 were limited to urban households whereas since 1963 the data were expanded 
to cover the entire nation.  
    Three characteristics can be read from these figures. (i) For both employee and all 
households the gap between the shares of top and bottom quintiles narrowed down 
significantly from both directions during the rapid growth era. (ii) Since the latter 1970s, 
the income shares among employee households have remained standstill, with the top 
quintile receiving 34 per cent and the bottom quintile receiving just about 10 per cent. 
(iii) Among all households, however, the income shares between the top and the bottom 
quintiles have continued to part again towards opposite directions.  
    Table 3, on the other hand, shows the movement of income distribution from a 
different statistical source. This data is aimed at collecting the background information 
for social security policies and is known to represent the low income households more 
adequately than the previous data. The data covers the entire population, i.e., single-
person households as well as farm households. The "primary income" refers to the sum of 
all private incomes while "redistributed income" includes the net benefits of social 
insurance, transfers net of taxes and in-kind income of medical benefits.  
    While the Gini coefficient of primary income is somewhat unstable during the 1970s, 
there is a definite decline (equalization) during the 1960s and the early 1970s and a 
relatively acute increase during the 1980s. The basic message is therefore similar to the 
one from Figure 9(b). This story is again corroborated by the shares of primary income 
going to the bottom and top quintiles, except that worsening of the bottom quintile share 
proves to be greatly accentuated in this data. Thus while it was more than 5 per cent 
during the 1970s it declined to mere 1.8 per cent in 1989. While the redistributed income 
somewhat ameliorated the declining share of the bottom quintile as well as the rising 
share of the top quintile, the distribution of income, both primary and redistributed, has 
become definitely more unequal in 1989 than at the start of the rapid growth era.  
    The prime suspect behind the steep rise in the inequality index observed above seems 
to be an increase in the number of non-working and unattached elderly persons, a 
circumstance that is associated with the rapid aging of the population. Quite unlike the 
United States or the United Kingdom where inequality of income was similarly 
aggravated during the 1980s, this country did not raise inequality among the non-
agricultural or non-single-person households, as seen by Figure 9, nor among wage 
earners. The increase in the Gini coefficient of individual wage earnings (among the regularly, non-part-time workers in private firms) during the decade of 1980s has been 
only on the order of .01 or .02 no matter how they were measured.  
Wealth Distribution  
    Still scanty data on household wealth distribution precludes a precise discussion of its 
time trend. The years for which we have comprehensive data on the distribution of real, 
as well as financial wealth, are limited to 1984 and 1989. Because of the steep 
speculative land price rises that occurred in the metropolitan areas of this country during 
the late 1980s (shown in Figure 2) and because of the accompanying rise in the stock 
prices the distribution of wealth has become abnormally dispersed. The Gini coefficient 
of total household net worth among all non-single person households actually increased 
from 0.52 in 1984 to 0.64 in 1989. After the burst of a "bubble" in the early 1990s the 
circumstance has been cooling off, the extent of which awaits examination with a new 
data (collected in 1994).  
    Apart from the capital gains in land, which from time to time aggravated wealth 
inequality, the distribution of net financial wealth, or more specifically, the holding of net 
financial wealth among different income classes equalized dramatically for employee 
households during the rapid growth era (which then became standstill after the mid-
1970s) and also for all non-agricultural non-single person households for which 
equalization continued throughout the period until the 1990s. (See Figure 9(a) and 9(b).) 
Such a tendency is in accord with the process of wealth equalization envisaged by 
Stiglitz's (1969) model of wealth distribution in a single-class neo-classical growth model 
(with a proviso that the savings function is not too convex with respect to income). The 
applicability of the single-class assumption in Japan seems to have been enhanced by a 
series of post- war reforms, including the agrarian reform (to be discussed later), 
dissolution of the zaibatsu (holding company) families and wealth levies.  
Poverty Reduction  
    The only official statistic on the extent of poverty is the number of households and 
individuals under public living assistance. The current system of living assistance was 
enacted in 1950 to implement the idea of fundamental right to live as recognized in the 
constitution (Article 25). It provides subsidies on basic living needs, supplementary aids 
on housing and children's education and medical benefits. Since the mid-1970s more than 
two-thirds (and 78 per cent in 1992) of the cases in which living assistance was initiated 
resulted from an injury or sickness of the household head, while those cases due to pure 
economic losses such as the loss or decrease of employment earnings, pension or family 
stipends or savings, add up to only one-tenth of the cases.  
    After initial adoption of the "market basket" method (until 1960), followed by the 
"Engel coefficient" method (1961&shyp;65) and the "income gap diminution" method 
(1965&shyp;83) to decide the level of the poverty income line (i.e., the level of income 
under which households can apply for living assistance), the government, since 1984, has 
adopted the "level balancing method" to keep pace with the increase in the consumption level of the general public. The implicit policy goal pursued during the income gap 
diminution method was to render the per capita consumption level of those assisted by 
the program around 60 per cent of that of an average employee household. A detailed 
study by Mizoguchi and Takayama (1984) estimates that this ratio (as compared with 
average employee households in Tokyo) actually rose from 38 per cent in 1960 to 50 per 
cent in 1965, 54 per cent in 1970 and 61 per cent in 1975; and by the mid- 1970s the 
policy goal was already fulfilled.  
    The movement in the ratio of the number of individuals in the assisted households over 
the total population is shown in Figure 10. It also shows the movement in the average 
size of households under assistance. Because of expansion in other social security 
programmes specifically addressed to the elderly (such as improvement in public pension 
benefits, and the old age medical care program) the number of the elderly assisted by the 
program has diminished relatively since 1975 to be replaced in greater proportion by 
people injured or ill, with physical disabilities or single mothers with dependent children.  
    Still the absolute size of the ratio in Figure 10, which was 2.2 per cent in 1955 and 0.7 
per cent in 1992, is believed to be greatly under-representing the number of individuals 
actually below the poverty income line. Complicated examination procedures required on 
application, official intervention into details of private life, and the social stigma attached 
to the status of being assisted all contribute to hamper the application itself. A 
government study (quoted in Mizoguchi and Takayama, 1984) reports that the ratio of the 
number of individuals actually under assistance to those who were eligible for assistance 
was estimated to be 16.2 per cent for 1955, 19.6 per cent for 1960 and 25.1 per cent for 
1965.  
    The poverty head count ratio using the official poverty income line explained above 
and the assumed coverage ratio of 15 per cent (to take the lower side of the above three 
figures) and using an equivalence scale to adjust for the household size, as estimated by 
Mizoguchi and Takayama, is 10 per cent for 1960. The ratio in question declined during 
the 1960s until it reached below 7 per cent in the mid-1970s. (Mizoguchi and Takayama, 
1984, pp. 123-4, Table 3-6).  
   
5. The Rapid Economic Growth Era and Income Equalization  
    We now turn to the explanation of the mechanism which brought about rapid economic 
growth together with equalization of income during the period of 1955&shyp;1973.  
One now standard exercise analyzing the sources of economic growth is that of growth 
accounting from the supply side. The computation offered by Jorgenson (1988, Table 1) 
shows that during the period 1960&shyp;79, which includes the rapid growth era, the 
contribution of the growth of capital input weighed more than 60 per cent of the picture. 
The study also shows sizeable effects of improvement in the quality of capital input as 
well as that of labour input. Nearly a quarter of the growth is accounted for by the 
residual technical progress term.      While this decomposition hints at the importance of capital accumulation and new 
technological knowledge, it in itself does not provide explanation of what has caused 
such a rapid pace of capital deepening and implementation of new technological 
knowledge.  
    A detailed industrial cross-section and time-series analysis of the manufacturing sector 
during the period of 1950s through 1980s by Yoshikawa (1992, Chapter 2) suggests that 
fluctuations in outputs during the rapid growth era were predominantly led by real shocks 
rather than monetary shocks, and moreover, that the real shocks consisted of demand 
shocks rather than productivity or supply-side shocks. Demand shocks were dominated 
by those of domestic fixed investment, in particular, those derived from construction 
works. Indeed, during the rapid growth era, investment activities in various subsectors of 
the manufacturing industry were highly correlated with each other, suggesting the 
presence of intensive backward and forward industrial linkages. 1  
    Such a finding is consistent with a popularized and yet intuitive argument to the effect 
that the strength of the domestic fixed investment has pulled the process of rapid growth. 
But the finding yet falls short of explaining what the underlying forces were which 
motivated such high investment rates. Several conceivable explanations are in order.  
    (i) A mixture of expectation and fear existed among industrialists that the country was 
soon opening up the domestic market to international trade, which meant that both at 
home and abroad their products must compete with foreign products which embody new 
advances in science and technology.  
    (ii) Unlimited supplies of inexpensive labour were available from the rural economy, 
providing the operating ground for the Lewis-type model. Cheap labour could ceteris 
paribus raise the marginal efficiency of capital in the modern sector. This explanation, 
however valid for pre-war years, does not seem to apply even for the initial stage of the 
rapid growth era. The reasons are two-fold: While in the pre-war years the real wage rates 
were kept virtually constant, in the post-war years the real wage kept rising as early as the 
start of the 1950s. Second, while there was actually a decrease in labour's income share 
during the latter 1950s, it was confined to the corporate sector rather than that of the self-
employed as might be the case under the Lewis model.  
    (iii) Large-scale movement of the population from the rural area to the urban centre, 
especially of young working people, brought about massive generation of new 
households. Creation of new households boosted the demand for consumer durables, 
which generated optimism and, through the forces of backward industrial linkages, 
generated demand for new equipment in all fronts. This is a hypothesis advanced by 
Yoshikawa (1992) as a sequel to his finding above.  
    (iv) Contrary to (ii), the continued rise in wage earnings and total farm income 
(supplemented by wage earnings) and the decreasing dispersion of household income 
during the 1960s enlarged the size of the domestic consumer durables market to a national level, thus enticing optimism. This can be regarded as a reverse of the Keynesian 
underconsumption hypothesis. It is also complementary with hypothesis (iii).  
    (v) The government maintained a macro policy of low interest rates, allowing some 
mild inflation (on average 5 per cent for the period of 1956 to 1973) to occur, except 
when the reserve of foreign exchanges became short (i.e., the Stop-Go policy), and at the 
same time maintained a disciplined surplus budget policy, which was conducive to 
fostering private-sector growth. The time paths of the rate of inflation (in terms of the 
household consumption deflator) and the government surplus (as measured by its saving-
investment balance) are charted in Figure 11.  
    (vi) The government efforts at collecting and analyzing information both on the 
economy as a whole and on private industry behaviour and at disseminating them as 
public information were instrumental in reducing uncertainties faced by individual 
entrepreneurs.  
    In what follows hypothesis (iv) will be elaborated as it concerns the relationship 
between equality and growth, or more specifically, the favourable effect of equality on 
growth.  
    One notable feature of the post-war economic development in Japan is that the 
informal sector of the Todaro-type did not emerge widely in the urban centres as people 
moved in from the rural area. Table 4 reveals that during the initial phase of the rapid 
growth era the number of casual or very low income workers dissipated quite rapidly 
even in absolute terms.  
    Two main reasons can be adduced to this. First, there was vigorous job creation both in 
the urban sector and the rural sector to which, as noted earlier, net births of small firms 
contributed a great deal 2 ;. Second, the population flow-out of agriculture, albeit very 
large in absolute size, was a relatively gradual and orderly one.  
    It might be added that both of these features were grounded and even prepared by the 
massive wealth transfer that occurred as a result of the post-war agrarian reform. Recall 
that the agrarian reform in Japan (in 1947) was conducted with genuine rigor. The land of 
absentee landlords was ordered to be sold away completely while only one hectare of the 
owner-cultivator's land was allowed to be kept by each. The extent of the reshuffle of 
land that this reform generated was enormous. Moreover, the price of land at which it 
was transferred to the former tenants was very low and because of the hyperinflation that 
followed it came to essentially nil. Thus the reform was effectively a confiscation of land.  
    The circumstances that led to the gradual outflow of population from agriculture were 
as follows: In the first place, farmers were in a sense tied to their own land because the 
strict stipulations of Agricultural Land Law of 1952 (though somewhat relaxed later in 
1962) hampered the transfer of ownership of land as well as land leasing (which was to 
secure the effect of the agrarian reform intact).      In the second place, introduction of part-time farming that began in the early 1950s 
assured moderate sum of income to farm households. Figure 12 based on a table 
compiled by Umemura (1961, p. 144, Table 16) is quite telling in this regard. It shows 
that - on average - per capita income of farmers with large land holding and that of those 
with very small land holding differed, at most, only by one-third, and the difference was 
much smaller for per capita expenditure. The trick lied in the significance of non-
agricultural income for households with small land holding. Needless to say, part-time 
farming was made possible by increased labour as well as land productivities. In 
particular, introduction of new and strong seed varieties and new rice planting methods 
(development and dissemination of which owed greatly to the agrarian experimental 
stations and technical assistance personnel from the government) and that of small-scale 
mechanization of the farming process were quite instrumental in achieving them.  
    In the third place, introduction of an income policy for farmers since the 1960s, which 
took the form of the "Production Cost and Income Compensation Formula" in 
determining the producer's price of rice, also contributed to raising farmers' income. 
Figure 13 shows that the prices of rice and agricultural output in general, which had been 
kept constant throughout the 1950s, started to rise rapidly from 1960 and throughout the 
1970s. Figure 14, in turn, shows that together with further expansion of part-time 
farming, the per capita farm household income (on average) has reached and even 
exceeded that of urban worker households since the early 1970s.  
    The foregoing can be summed up by saying that the income disparity between urban 
and rural households as well as those among rural households were kept at a moderate 
level. It is quite conceivable that had the income distribution not been so equal there 
might have developed a huge informal sector in the urban centres.  
    We have already seen in Figure 9(a) that income distribution among employees was 
significantly equalized during the 1960s. In fact, tightening of the labour market that 
proceeded since the early 1960s rendered a decrease in various indicators of wage 
disparity, between age groups, blue-collar and white-collar jobs, education groups and 
firm size groups, as indicated in Tables 5 and 6.  
    The equalization of income has had at least three favourable effects on fixed 
investment demand.  
    First, it provided a nation-wide mass market for consumer durables. This is the route 
stated in hypothesis (iv). In fact, the spread of consumer durables among households was 
quite rapid and only a small lag was involved between the urban and rural areas. This is 
shown by Figure 15 (which is reproduced from Kosai,1986, Table 7-1).  
    Second, it facilitated the spread of secondary (and even higher) education nation-wide, 
providing trainable young workers who could adapt to new technology relatively easily. 
It is precisely here that one can point out the favourable effect of human development on 
economic growth.      Third, it facilitated the redrawing of new employer-employee relations in the leading 
large firms, eradicating the radical political elements of the early post-war years and 
founding a principle of co-operation. Such a practice strengthened the internal training 
system of workers and provided well-trained and highly motivated workers. It also 
fermented a social environment in which new technology could be easily incorporated.  
    It is to be pointed out that the foregoing stories seem perfectly consistent with the 
Jorgenson's growth accounting result referred to earlier.  
    I should also like remark here that the exporting capability of the machinery industry 
that Japan is currently famous for (in particular, electronic products, transportation 
equipment and precision instruments)was established only after the mid-1970s. It is, 
however, an outcome of a long process of preparation, assimilating the new technologies 
imported from the West and improving them by way of developing new marketable 
products. The pressures of emulating other firms in introducing new technology (from 
abroad initially and by developing their own later) and building new plants, thus trying to 
remain competitive in the internationally opening markets, were very strong among the 
Japanese manufacturing firms in the 1960s (to the extent that they often ignored the 
advice of the government to curtail the level of investment). Indeed it is the rapid growth 
of employment demand originating from the installation of new plants and equipment 
that tightened the labour market in the 1960s, bringing about equalization of income and 
reduction of poverty.  
    Government policy makers and business leaders foresaw the development of the 
nation's own innovative capability to be an essential prerequisite for exporting capability, 
which led them to draw plans to improve secondary and tertiary education as early as in 
the beginning of the 1960's. 3  
   
6. The role of government policies  
    While the major engine of economic growth and the forces that brought about equality 
in income distribution resided in the working of the private market economy itself, the 
government has had an active supporting role on both. Moreover, the government may 
justifiably be said to have played a major role in improving the human development 
conditions as reviewed in Section 3.  
    The role of government in supporting economic growth in the post-war period, 
especially where under the name of industrial policy, has been widely discussed with 
both pros and cons. It should therefore suffice to describe its role very briefly here.  
    The industrial policy of the government began in the form of a stringent direct control 
of energy (i.e., coal) and foreign exchange allotment in the early reconstruction period. It 
then turned into indirect means such as protective tariffs, preferential allotment of 
government bank credits and interest subsidies, and advantageous scheduling of 
depreciation allowances to selected industries. Since the early 1960s, however, the government has come to be obliged by the international commitment to liberalize trade 
and capital controls, which led to continual reduction of tariff rates and lifting up of other 
trade barriers. The government then shifted to structural policies, relaxing the application 
of the anti-trust law (which is an outcome of the post-war democratic reform) in 
encouraging mergers of major firms to resist the potential entry of foreign giants and 
allowing formation of cartels under various specified circumstances to encourage 
reorganization of the industry. While diversity of opinions exist with regard to the 
effectiveness of the later policies most researchers seem to agree in hailing the wisdom of 
the policies during the reconstruction period and the early phase of the rapid growth era.  
    One particular arena of government policy that has been instrumental in supporting 
continuous births of small firms, which was pointed out earlier as a source of vigorous 
job creation, is the credit policy on small firms. Founded on the spirit of Basic Law on 
Small and Medium Size Firms (promulgated in 1963) to modernize the technology and 
the organization of small firms and thus to strengthen the basis of their profitable 
operation, the government has established an extensive set of credit support measures.  
    The first type of support is the preferential treatment such as tax grants and relaxed 
application of the regulations on deposit interest rates towards credit unions and mutual 
banks, which are the private financial institutions specialized in the finance of small 
firms.4  
    The second type is the operation of public financial agencies for small and medium 
firms. These public institutions have employed the funds of fiscal investment and loan 
programmes (which, in turn, are financed largely through postal savings of households) 
to support business start-ups by offering long-term interest subsidized loans.  
    An important policy measure also supportive of the credit environment for small firms 
has been the enforcement of the law entitled Prevention of Delayed Payment on 
Subcontracting Firms (originally introduced in 1956). As the title suggests this law 
helped to prevent the parent firms from exercising their superior power in not paying 
their smaller subcontractors on the promised dates.  
    Simultaneous to the encouragement of growth-oriented industries, the government was 
also active in making the exit of declining industries - such as the coal industry in the 
early 1960s and the synthetic fiber industry in the mid-1970s - a less painful one,. It was 
not always successful in its handling of the matter, however, the extreme case of which 
being the rice production in agriculture, to which we come back again later.  
Development of Government Expenditure  
    Before discussing the role of government in income distribution and human 
development it is necessary to review the development of government expenditure during 
the period of our study.      The movement in the composition of major categories of expenditures in the total 
government expenditure, with the central and local governments combined, is charted as 
Figure 16. Table 7, on the other hand, shows selected items of government expenditures 
as ratios of GDP. The content of each item is explained in the notes to the figure and the 
table.  
    The ratio of total spending over GDP remained roughly constant during the late 1950s 
to the beginning of the 1970s at a little above 20 per cent and then started to climb up 
during the 1970s to reach a peak in the beginning of the 1980s of 33 per cent.  
    As shown in Figure 11 the government maintained budget surplus for most of the years 
during the latter 1950s up till 1974. In effect, the government limited the increase of total 
spending by the amount that could be financed through the fruit of economic growth. 
Since the mid-1970s, however, the government committed itself to increasing both the 
social welfare payments and the pension benefits (which are a part of social insurance), 
whereas the sudden shrinkage of economic growth forced the decline of tax revenues. 
The outcome was the going into debt from 1975, which continued until 1986. The size of 
the budget deficit relative to GDP amounted to 3 per cent to 5 per cent for most of the 
decade with a peak of 5.5 per cent in 1978. Such a prolonged deficit forced the 
government into an austere fiscal reconstruction plan from the early 1980s, imposing an 
absolute ceiling on most expenditure items (except for defence and ODA spending). This 
effort is reflected in the decrease of total spending/GDP ratio since 1984 (Figure 16) and 
the budget surplus from 1987 again (Figure 11). By 1990 the total spending/GDP ratio 
has gone down to a little above 30 per cent, but in the wake of both a long recession since 
1991 and severe trade friction with the United States resulting in a demand for increased 
domestic demand, the government again turned into deficit in 1993.  
    Apart from the administrative costs of the government, the four biggest expenditures 
are civil engineering works, education, social security, each amounting to more than 5 per 
cent of GDP recently, and industrial promotion, at around 3 per cent of GDP and whose 
largest component is the support of agriculture (more about this below). The defence 
expenditure has been kept below 1 per cent of GDP throughout the entire period since 
1960.  
    Some notable characteristics of the transition in the composition of the government 
expenditure are the following.  
    First, until the mid-1960s the biggest single item of government expenditure was 
education, until it was taken over by civil engineering works during the later part of the 
1960s and the early 1970s. The expenditure on education increased again relatively 
during the later 1970s, reaching the peak of 6.7 per cent (of GDP), but since 1983 it has 
become subject to the absolute ceiling constraint described above, and its ratio over GDP 
has declined to a little above 5 per cent. The effect of such constraints is shown vividly in 
Figure 17 where the ratios of public expenditure per student for each school type 
normalized by GDP per capita are drawn. (The expenditure in question includes subsidies 
to private schools.) Except for the subsidies to officially approved occupational schools that began in the late 1970s (for which the ratio continued to rise) and to schools for the 
handicapped (for which the ratio almost stood still) the ratios continued to decline until 
the end of the 1980s.5  
    Second, the social security expenditure started from a little above 2 per cent in the late 
1950s with the greater part of the expenditure going into poverty abeyance (such as 
public living assistance and unemployment relief works) and small payments on social 
welfare and social insurance (amounting to only 0.5 per cent). With the start of the 
national pension system and the national health insurance system (both in 1961), which 
covered virtually every citizen of the country, the government expenditure on social 
insurance (i.e., the subsidy on benefits) immediately doubled to 0.6 per cent. 6  Since 
then, this item has been on the increase, with another major jump occurring in 1974. 1974 
is often called the "first year of pension" in this country as a major revision in the public 
pension system made in 1973 provided a significant increase in the level of public 
pension benefits, and, moreover,, automatic adjustment of the level of benefits to cost of 
living increase was assured. 7  Expenditure on poverty relief, on the other hand, has 
declined steadily until it occupied only 0.6 per cent in the 1990s.  
    Third, although expenditure on public hygiene never occupied more than 1 per cent of 
GDP, there was a significant increase in the early 1960s, doubling in  
terms of the ratio over GDP.  
The Redistributive Role of the Government  
    Concerning the distributional effects of the government expenditure it is worthwhile to 
distinguish those that have direct redistributional effects such as social welfare and 
poverty relief measures, and those that have indirect effects, that is, which improve the 
productive capacity of some particular group of individuals.  
    The magnitude of the former type of activity has already been explained. An example 
of the latter is the promotion of agriculture. Together with the price-support measures it 
amounts to roughly 2 per cent of GDP, and it constitutes more than a half of the total 
expenditure on promoting industries. In terms of public finance, provision for physical 
social overheads, public health measures and education facilities and programmes has 
been conducted on the basis of nationally determined standards, and the local 
governments can ask for central government subsidies to fill up the lacking funds. Such 
transfers of central government resources to local government bodies have been called 
"local allocation tax grants", and have constituted 18.9 per cent (on average throughout 
the period 1955&shyp;1993) of the general budget of the central government.  
    Figure 18 drawn on the basis of Mochida (1990, p.89, Supplementary Table 1) shows 
the disparity (Gini coefficient) of per capita prefectural income together with those of per 
capita local allocation tax grants allotted to each prefecture and the total sum of general 
funds secured by each prefecture. Per capita prefectural income can be construed as a 
proxy for the size of a local tax base. The table makes it clear that during the period of 
1955 to 1972 the disparity in the allotment of local allocation tax grants to each prefecture contributed greatly in ameliorating the effect of regional disparity in income 
on local government budget.  
    Despite the various conceivable drawbacks of the high degree of centralization in the 
government policy 8  such activities seem certainly to have contributed to the reduction 
of regional disparity in the production capacities, including human resources.  
The Human development role of the government  
    Concerning the positive role of government on human development conditions, we 
take up the case of infant and under-five mortality rates. Recall that these mortality rates 
decreased rapidly during the 1960s (Figure 4). As noted earlier, this was also the period 
during which expenditure on public hygiene relative to GDP increased sharply, and we 
can quite naturally suppose that the latter caused the formerr.9  We should, however, be 
reminded that this was also the period of rapid growth in household income so that the 
decrease in mortality rates might merely reflect the general rise in the living condition. 
Therefore it is desirable to see whether the government effort on hygiene had positive 
effects on the reduction of the mortality rates that were independent of the increase in 
household income.  
    A standard regression test is performed on this point. The dependent variables are the 
rates of decrease in the infant mortality rate (GINF) and the under five mortality rate 
(GUDF), while the independent variables are the real rate of growth in per capita 
household disposable income (WY), the real rate of increase in government expenditure 
on hygiene (WHG) (the deflator being that for government final consumption), and the 
single-year lagged variables of WY and WHG. Since there is a widely known abnormal 
behaviour on the child birth rate due to a superstition (by the name of Hinoe-uma) in 
1966 10  we have taken out the years 1966 and 1967 from our observations. The rate of 
change variable is taken as a dependent variable because of the possibility of saturation in 
the decline of mortality rates.  
    The result of the regression analysis is shown in Table 8. It shows that an added 1 
percent in the rate of increase in real public hygiene expenditure results in 0.1 percent 
addition in the rate of decrease in the under-five mortality rate (GUDF) and 0.16 percent 
addition in the rate of decrease in the infant mortality rate (GINF), even when the growth 
of per capita household disposable income (WY) is accounted for. In fact, addition of 
WY variable does not affect the coefficient on WHG. The coefficient on GINF is 
strongly statistically significant (at 1 per cent) while that on GUDF is weakly significant 
(at 5 or 10 per cent). In any case, this result provides a statistical evidence for the 
effectiveness of the government policies on mortality rates.  
7. The problems for the future  
    Despite this country's vast accomplishments so far with respect to growth, distribution 
and human development, there remain several issues which require further improvement. 
Government policies should also be examined critically.  Pollution and Environment  
    The first issue is the prevention of pollution. The rapid growth era was accompanied 
by numerous serious incidences of air, water and road pollution symbolically represented 
by the Minamata organic mercury poisoning case, whereby the brain nerve systems of 
thousands of people were gravely paralyzed and many were killed by the discharged 
factory water of a chemical company. (The cause and the pollutant were officially 
identified in 1956.) Furthermore, with the spread of highway construction in the midst of 
the densely populated metropolitan areas, street pollution of noxious gas, noise and 
vibration became serious. The burden of pollution was generally concentrated on poor 
people, which suggests that one cannot be content with equality in the distribution of 
pecuniary income alone. The government was rather reluctant and slow to intervene in 
the above cases, electing to prioritize the promotion of industry and economic growth. 
The health of the victims were regarded as subordinate to the "interest of the general 
public".  
    Mounting popular awareness and concern on pollution and filing of suits by the 
victims against the polluting firms led the parliament to enact various anti-pollution laws 
culminating in Pollution Crime Act, which was put into effect in 1971. This act imposed 
criminal penalty on the discharge of harmful materials relating to business activity, 
regardless of whether wilful or accidental. Moreover, the burden of proof rested in effect 
on the side of the polluters. The Environmental Protection Agency was simultaneously 
instituted to oversee the matter.  
    The first half of the 1970s marked the height of the environmental protection 
movement in Japan. The courts made a series of clear-cut rulings on civil pollution cases 
in favour of victims, thus confirming citizens' fundamental environmental rights. The 
managers of polluting firms were criminally prosecuted. Education in problems of the 
environment and pollution was added into primary and secondary school curricula. The 
OECD report published in 1977 (The Environmental Policy of Japan) praised this 
country for having already solved its environment problem.  
    There has been, however, a significant retreat in the government's environmental 
policy since the second half of the 1970s, especially with respect to the criteria for 
enforcement of environmental laws. For instance, in 1978 the Environment Protection 
Agency significantly curtailed the standard for controlling air pollution from not more 
than 0.02 ppm of NO2 density in the air (on average per day) to not more than 0.04-0.06 
ppm, which immediately opened the way for further construction of major road networks 
inside the densely populated areas. It appears that, confronted with the heavier constraints 
on growth in the slow growth era, the government has returned to the policy of favouring 
industrial interests.  
Duality of the labour market and unequal opportunities for men and women  
    Despite the overall moderateness in the inequality of income distribution, there are at 
least two problems that must be discussed. The first concerns the dual labour market or labour-market segmentation, while the second concerns the inequality in labour-market 
opportunities for men and women. The latter is already taken into account by the abrupt 
decline in the human development index when inequality between men and women is 
taken into account. Figure 19 (based on a table compiled by Osawa, 1993, p. 70, Table 3-
2) shows the movement of the wage disparity between men and women for each age 
group. While the disparity has been decreasing for young workers (partly explained by 
the catch-up of the education level of women), it has even increased since the mid 1970s 
for women above age forty.  
    The author's own study (Ishikawa and Dejima, 1994), using micro-wage data of 1980 
and 1990 and applying the methodology of switching regressions, confirms the presence 
of a dual-wage structure, one standing for the primary labour market with high returns on 
education, duration of service in the current firm (hereafter referred to as tenure) and 
external experience, and another standing for the secondary labour market with little 
return on education and external experience. The secondary market does pay a moderate 
return (roughly half that of the primary market) on tenure so that wages do rise as 
workers continue to stay in the same firm. In this sense the secondary market differs from 
that in the United States where the presence of similar duality has previously been shown. 
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    Such features are clearly seen by the wage manifolds depicted on the basis of 
estimation results in Figure 20, drawn separately for men and women. The figure 
underlines the difference in the labour market opportunities that exist between men and 
women.  
    The proportion of workers in the primary sector is estimated to be roughly 35&shyp;40 
per cent, leaving the majority of workers to the secondary sector. The simultaneously 
estimated switch equation (which assigns the probability of belonging to the primary 
sector for each worker) indicates that the distribution of secondary-sector jobs are far 
more frequently found in small firms than in large firms. Noting that there is frequent 
turnover of jobs in the small-firm sector, this means that the disparity of life-time 
earnings between workers in the primary labour market of large firms and workers in the 
secondary market of small firms is far greater than the disparity of one-shot 
contemporaneous wages. An important point is that such duality is not a phenomenon of 
the past, but may expand in the future. In fact, the current labour force in Japan is 
increasingly replaced by part-time employees, especially women, whose job content, pay 
and job stability leave much room for improvement.  
   
The Education System  
    What cannot be dissociated from the structure of the labour market discussed above is 
the structure of education. Whereas this country has succeeded in raising the school 
enrolment ratios and improving the educational standards in various respects, it does not 
yet seem to have succeeded in establishing a well diversified school system, in particular 
at the secondary level. Figure 21 shows that the occupationally-oriented high schools are becoming increasingly unpopular, rendering everyone to compete on the same ground. 
This competition in the sphere of education obviously corresponds to the competition to 
enter the primary segment of the labour market. Such a circumstance is far from ideal 
when multifarious human capabilities are mutually respected and rewarded accordingly. 
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Agriculture and small firms  
    We turn now to the failure of this country to generate a sustainable agricultural sector, 
despite the continued huge doses of government subsidies directed towards the sector. 
This suggests the importance of a delicate timing-control problem. While the 
redistributive role of the government, particularly in boosting the income of the 
agricultural households during the 1960s has already been evaluated positively in terms 
of bringing a balanced expansion of consumption which, in turn, induced a spurt in fixed-
investment activities, it was not withdrawn even when it was no longer needed. 
Ultimately, the policy has not fostered an environment in which full-time and willing 
farmers can make the best of their efforts. The country now seems to be paying a high 
cost on account of the distorted effects. Income policies, in particular, are inclined to 
generate vested interests and invite lobbying activities by the groups concerned.  
    There are other spheres, such as the protection of small firms, where a similar verdict 
seems to apply. In fact, too many small firms that are not sustainable once policy 
assistance (which may be in the form of exemption from the regulations) is lifted seem to 
remain. The examples are the leeways in the areas of work safety regulation and the 
restriction of working hours. This suggests that the redistributive policies of the direct 
type should incorporate a self-ending mechanism when they are initiated.  
Urban Congestion Problems  
    Finally, we may briefly mention that this country has generated excessive population 
congestion in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The housing conditions, transportation for 
commuting to the workplace, and greens and parks for recreation, all still remain very 
poor.  
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1.  On the other hand, fluctuations in outputs during the period from the mid-1970s to 1980s were 
predominantly led by shocks in export demand. It should also be pointed out here that the major engine of 
job creation during the rapid growth era resided in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, introduction of 
new technology in large firms meant that small and medium-size subcontracting firms (whose prevalence 
has been another major characteristic of the Japanese manufacturing sector) had to cope with them also by 
improving their production facilities. Such a pattern of industrial growth encouraged the job creation 
especially among young workers, who were believed to be highly malleable and trainable.  2.   As a matter of fact, continuous births and rebirths of small firms which have been maintained in Japan 
throughout the entire period imply the presence of a highly competitive market environment and the 
existence of a financial infrastructure to support the generation of new firms. Furthermore, very frequently 
they imply trying out of new ideas. Thus they have undoubtedly been congenial to productive efficiency 
and economic growth. Creation of such a competitive environment was prompted by two facets of post-war 
democratic reform, the significant wealth transfer among the population (discussed in the text) and the 
establishment of strong anti-trust measures. Maintaining high employment (or low unemployment) has also 
been facilitated by continuous births and rebirths of small firms as separated workers could easily find an 
alternative workplace.  
3.  This is seen in an influential government report entitled Problems of the Development of Human 
Capabilities prepared by the Economic Council of the Prime Minister in 1963. In fact, this report presents a 
viewpoint which is far wider than the usual report on human resources, and may be regarded as a first 
"human development" report in Japan.  
4.  These institutions are outgrowths of local and communal systems of mutual credit (formerly called 
Tanomoshiko and Yui) that developed spontaneously in Japan after the Edo period. Tax grants to these 
institutions are wide ranging, from corporate income taxes, stamp taxes to local property taxes. These 
institutions are also allowed to offer higher set of deposit interest rates than regular commercial banks to 
attract depositers.  
5.  The path of the higher education should also be explained. Until the mid-1960s the ratio was about 1.8 
times the per capita GDP. Since then until 1970 it decreased sharply towards 1.2, reflecting the expansion 
of private universities. While the ratio started to rise again in the 1970s (with the introduction of subsidies 
to private universities) it had to face the fiscal constraints during the 1980's. The stall in the university 
enrolment ratio after mid-1970s that we saw in Figure 7 can partly be explained by the increased burden of 
tuition costs and other fees placed on students.  
6.   In the case of medical costs, the proportion of total medical costs borne by the government sums up to 
30.6 per cent in 1993, which increased from 15.9 per cent in 1955 to the peak of 36.4 per cent in 1983 and 
has declined since then. The ratio of total medical costs over GDP, on the other hand, increased from 2.8 
per cent in 1955 to 5.5 per cent in 1993.  
7.   It was only after the major revision of the program in 1973 that individuals could start counting on 
pension benefits as a major income source after retirement. Previously, individuals' own saving efforts plus 
possible supports by children (which, in turn, was not entirely costless as it was more rightly be regarded as 
a family insurance system) and a prolonged working life were the major means to make the ends meet for 
the elderly people. Various studies suggest that saving for old age seems to have played a primary role in 
generating high net financial saving on the part of Japanese households.  
8.   For instance, it has frequently been pointed out by specialists on education that the setting and 
enforcement of a standardized and detailed national curriculum on primary schools under the direction of 
the Ministry of Education have narrowed the room for spontaneous activities and experiments of individual 
teachers and localities, thereby robbing of their incentives.  
9.  The human development report of the Economic Council referred to earlier in footnote 3 made a 
prediction (in p. 323) that, given the existing experiences in other developed countries, the infant mortality 
rate (33.7 in 1959) could be reduced to 20.2 (which is 60 per cent of the previous figure) but that in order to 
achieve that goal by 1970 the country would require a major effort addressed to its reduction.  
10.   This superstition developed in Edo period says that a woman born in a hinoe-uma year (which 
happens once in 60 years in the old Chinese calendar) would kill her husband. Consequently, women born 
in this year would face difficulty in marriage. In fact, the birth rate of this year dropped to 13.7 per 
thousand while that of the neighbouring years was around 18 per thousand.  11.   It is due to rapidity of economic growth that the wages of the primary and secondary sectors as 
reflected in the wage disparity of different education groups and different sized firms converged (as seen in 
Table 6). In the slow growth era there is no theoretical necessity that those wage disparities would 
converge, which was actually the case in Japan. The relationship between wage disparities and the 
economic growth rates are discussed in Ishikawa (1981) within the framework of a growth model with dual 
labour markets.  
12.  It should be noted that the Japanese government once actually drew a picture very close to such an 
ideal. (Cf. The Economic Council report of 1963 referred to earlier.) It recognized the need to transform the 
labour market into a one in which individuals could move between firms each having distinguished and 
objectively assessed occupational skills. Such a market may be identified as what is sometimes called the 
occupational labour market. The reason why Japan has not succeeded in achieving such a goal is, first, that 
the existing structure of the labour market (both at the time of the early 1960s and contemporary) has more 
universal grounds than merely reflecting the particular historical experience of this country, and second, the 
stated goal requires establishment of extensive public or semi-public skill training institutions. This is 
perceptively discussed in Marsden (1990). The policy formers did not have the appropriate perception at 
the time.  
 